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THE ILLINOIS WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
SYSTEM: A DESCRIPTION AND CRITIQUE
Douglas F. Stevenson*
Illinois' workmen's compensation system has been the subject of
intense debate in the last several years. As a result, the statutes
governing the area have undergone considerable amendment. The
author describes the current system and points out many of the
weaknesses and absurdities that still exist despite those recent ef-
forts.
Workmen's compensation, the initial "no fault" concept, is de-
signed to provide a simple, inexpensive and expeditious remedy for
disputes involving accidents arising out of and in the course of
employment. Because of trial delay, the classic common law doctrines
of negligence and fault in assessing financial liability do not lend
themselves to resolving the injured worker's immediate problems
such as medical care and financial sustenance of his family during
recuperation from an injury.
Few employees recovered under the negligence concept because of
the defenses of contributory negligence, the fellow servant rule, and
assumption of risk doctrine. 1 If one did recover, there was a lengthy
period when his family had no income. Even with the best of inten-
tions, an employer could hardly supply medical attention or family
sustenance without his conduct being construed as an admission of
liability, with the consequent risk of a large jury verdict.
In the "no fault" concept of workmen's compensation, the
employee gave up his right to a jury trial and the employer agreed to
furnish medical attention and make immediate payments for lost time
whether or not there was negligence, in return for limited liability.
The task of determining the rights and liabilities under this new con-
cept was given to an administrative agency, the Illinois Industrial
Commission, with the directive that "the process and procedure be-
fore the Commission shall be as simple and summary as reasonably
may be." 2
* Senior partner, Books, Pitts, Fullagar & Poust; formerly chairman of Illinois Manufactur-
ers Association Workers' Compensation Committee; formerly chairman of Joint Employers As-
sociation Committee on Workmen's Compensation Legislation; formerly president and currently
a director of the Better Government Association; B.A., DePauw University; J.D., Harvard Uni-
versity.
1. 1 T. ANGERSTEIN, ILLINOIS WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 2 (rev. ed. 1952).
2. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.16 15(1977).
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How well is the workmen's compensation system working in
Illinois? First, the system is about to choke. The number of filed
cases at the Illinois Industrial Commission has almost quadrupled
since 1950 from 15,000 per year to 57,500 in 1977. 3 There has been
no commensurate increase in personnel or improvements in its an-
tiquated procedures. The crush is more than the agency can handle. 4
Second, almost all of these cases involve attorneys operating under
the adversary system, with the associated complement of doctors for
examination and testimony. The expense of common law litigation is
not reduced in accordance with the expectations. 5 Third, because of
the constant pressures to increase the level of benefits, workmen's
compensation is no longer a system in which the liabilities are truly
limited. 6
Last, it is illusory to claim that the public has been insulated from
the cost of these workmen's compensation benefits simply because
the burden has been placed upon the employers. Every employer
must recover the cost of these benefits in the price of his product or
service, a price which is paid by the consuming public. If an
employer does not recover this as well as his other costs, he inevita-
bly goes out of business. Whether an employer pays directly or car-
ries insurance, the cost burden is roughly the same.
The dramatic increase in workmen's compensation benefits in 1975
and the consequent increase in cost have affected the Illinois business
climate. Illinois is the highest of some thirty-three states recently
surveyed by the Illinois Fiscal Commission. 7 Workmen's compensa-
tion and unemployment insurance costs (also dramatically increased in
1975) are two of the three most negative factors in the Illinois
economic climate. Illinois producers are at a disadvantage with re-
spect to competitors from other states and other countries because of
this disproportionate cost burden. The state's major sources of tax
revenue, the sales and income taxes, depend upon business volume
3. These figures are the most accurate estimates available based on the docket books of the
Illinois Industrial Commission.
The Commission has a tremendous base for statistical data in its files but little ability to
retrieve the information. Recognizing the severity of the problem, the Commission contracted
in 1974 with Delta Systems Corporation for development of a computerized information control
system for the Industrial Commission. However, the new system lacks programming or capacity
for retrieval of meaningful information.
4. See text accompanying notes 14-16 infra.
5. See text accompanying notes 26-36 infra.
6. See text accompanying notes 49-95 infra.
7. ILLINOIS FISCAL COMMISSION, REPORT ON ECONOMIC AND FISCAL TRENDS IN THE
STATE OF ILLINOIS 14-17 (December 2, 1977).
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which must expand if the state is to have the necessary revenues to
meet the apparently inevitable inflation in the cost of government, as
well as to insure jobs for future Illinois citizens.
The legislature, the ultimate arbiter, must recognize the impact of
its actions upon the general welfare of the state. It is this writer's
observation that a majority of the legislature has functioned in this
area as if it were umpiring an intramural football game between man-
agement and labor with little thought to the wider consequences. 8
This Article will examine the operation of this "no fault" law in
Illinois, the Industrial Commission which administers it, and the var-
ious interest groups at work within it, as seen by the author after
twenty-seven years of involvement. The observations made are not
intended as personal criticism of any particular persons participating
in the system. Its criticisms and recommendations are directed at the
system itself. Nor is this Article intended to cast doubt upon the
feasibility of no fault systems in other areas. It should demonstrate,
however, that the current Illinois workmen's compensation system is
no model.
This Article is a description and a critique of the Illinois workmen's
compensation law and procedures. One questions whether it can
properly be called a "system" in the legal sense; within a very loose
legal framework, it is a series of ad hoc decisions by more than
twenty-five individuals pursuing no published common standard or
philosophy in making adjudications. Similar cases are not similarly
decided. This Article further questions whether the primary bene-
ficiaries of the "system" are injured workers or the lawyers who prac-
tice within it.
THE CURRENT CRISIS IN THE SYSTEM
In brief outline, the Illinois system is a voluntary one in which the
benefits are supposed to flow from the employer, or the insurance
company, to the employee without the need for any legal proceed-
ing. Medical attention for an injured employee and the prompt pay-
ment of weekly benefits to sustain his family, in the event there is
lost time, are immediate problems for the injured worker. Permanent
disability, if any, is theoretically so finely demarcated and structured
as to seldom result in a dispute.
Only in the event of a dispute about the compensation payable
does the Commission have any jurisdiction. 9 A complaint,
8. See text accompanying notes 96-102 infra.
9. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.19 (1977).
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called an Application, is filed and heard by an arbitrator at the first
level. 10 Either side may appeal to the full Commission and present
additional evidence and oral argument before the full Commission."
The decision of the Commission may be appealed to the circuit
court' 2 and then directly to the supreme court. 13
This simple statement of the basic procedure belies the com-
plexities and idiosyncrasies of the process as it actually unfolds. This
process in action" is the basic subject matter of this Article.
The Litigation Explosion in
Workmen's Compensation
The litigation explosion in workmen's compensation is real. Its exp-
lanation reveals many inadequacies of the process. The number of
filed cases has almost quadrupled since 1950.11 The increase in
numbers is fairly uniform throughout the state. Some of us recall in
the early 1950's when only fifteen cases were on the docket in Joliet
for one day each month. In October, 1977, an arbitrator spent five
10. Id. Seldom utilized is an authorized committee of arbitration, in which each party may
appoint a person to work with a person appointed by the Commission.
11. Id. § 138.19(e).
12. Id. § 138.19(f)(1). The State of Illinois, however, is forbidden to appeal beyond the
Commission.
13. ILL. SuP. CT. R. 302(a). Under the Judicial Article of the Illinois Constitution, appeals
go to the appellate rather than the supreme court. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 6. However, the
supreme court agreed to take workmen's compensation cases directly from the circuit court in
1964 at the request of the labor unions in order to get labor support for the 1964 amendment to
the Judicial Article of the Constitution. The author, representing employer organizations, par-
ticipated in the conferences which led to Rule 302(a).
14. By definition, all filed cases are cases in which disputes have arisen. ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 48, § 138.19 (1977).
According to the docket books of the Commission, the numbers are as follows:
1950 15,168
1955 21,037
1960 25,218
1965 29,256
1970 34,699
1971 34,663
1972 34,624
1973 38,846
1974 40,290
1975 40,117
1976 48,189
1977 57,484
The progression is almost geometric; the number doubled between 1950 and 1965 and nearly
doubled again by 1977.
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days in Joliet with an average number of 75 cases set for each day.
Other examples of the current load for an arbitrator are Benton-135
cases for two days, Macomb-47 cases for one day, Aurora-157
cases for two days, Taylorville-71 cases for one day, Wheaton-392
cases for four days.
Obviously, one arbitrator sitting in these locations cannot hear evi-
dence and make decisions on even ten percent of these cases. While
some may be settled between the parties without trial, the balance
must be continued to a future date when they join other new cases.
The number of new filings exceeds those disposed of by trial or set-
tlement. The increased number of filed cases does not fully reflect
the litigation load. More than half of the arbitrators' decisions are
appealed to the full Commission, 15 creating a burden which that body
can hardly discharge.
Even the Supreme Court of Illinois finds that a substantial portion
of its case load is appeals in workmen's compensation cases. While it
affirms the Commission in most cases, the continued flow of appeals
reflects the dissatisfaction and frustration of litigants with the Indus-
trial Commission. The supreme court, obviously bored with its
workmen's compensation docket, has come very close to affirming
contradictory decisions of the Industrial Commission. One can find
support for almost any position in the decisions of the supreme court.
The voluntary portion of the Illinois workmen's compensation
system-the prompt furnishing of medical attention and the im-
mediate payment of temporary total compensation for lost time
accidents-works well. 16 The present system for handling disputes,
however, is incompatible with its purpose-to provide a speedy, in-
expensive remedy. The litigation explosion merely aggravates and ex-
poses the problem. The problem suggests one remedy, namely to
increase the number of hearing officers and commissioners to accom-
modate the increased load. But before adopting this simplistic solu-
tion, one should examine the reasons for this litigation explosion and
the basic machinery involved.
Causes of the Litigation Explosion
Some alleged causes of the litigation explosion in workmen's com-
pensation can be dismissed. It is not explained, for example, by in-
creases in the number of persons employed. According to the Illinois
15. This is the comment of several commissioners. See note 3 supra.
16. This is a consensus drawn from conversations with attorneys. There are no statistics. See
note 3 supra.
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Department of Labor, there were 3,160,000 employed persons in
1950 and 4,424,900 in 1975.17 This increase in the working popula-
tion does not explain a quadrupling of litigated cases by the Illinois
Industrial Commission.
The number of accidents does not explain the increase either. In
fact, the National Safety Council reports that "lost time" accidents
decreased from 940 (per million hours worked) in 1950 to 668 in
1976.18 The United States Bureau of Labor Statistics notes that the
total number of occupational injuries had declined by sixteen percent,
the number of "lost time" cases by nine percent, and the number of
fatalities by ten percent from 1974 to 1975.19
Other factors which may bear examination are an increased aware-
ness of legal rights, increased activity on the part of unions, lawyers,
doctors, or others, and increased benefits. These three items merge
in any discussion, for each contributes to the other.
The Unions
With the principal organizing drives over, union leadership has
turned more and more to providing services for its members as a
partial justification for the union's existence and dues structure.
While the state and national labor organizations handle legislative
problems, many local unions are active and supportive in individual
injury cases. Many local unions have workmen's compensation com-
mittees whose members attend instructional classes and learn about
the field of workmen's compensation in order to counsel members
who suffer injuries in employment. This is a thoroughly legitimate
service not unlike those which clubs and organizations, even political
organizations, perform for members.
In the present state of workmen's compensation in Illinois, how-
ever, the union activity amounts to little more than a lawyer referral
service. Frequently, the union fills out the Application and the attor-
ney never meets his client until the day of the hearing. Not unnatur-
ally, a considerable number of attorneys are eager to be the one to
whom the union refers its members. The selection of an attorney
based upon his ability, character, ideological affinity, or prior friend-
17. See ILLINOIS BUREAU OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, ILLINOIS TOTAL CIVILIAN WORK
FORCE EMPLOYMENT & UNEMPLOYMENT (1972).
18. NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS 28 (1977).
19. See ILLINOIS BUREAU OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, LABOR FORCE INFORMATION FOR
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PROGRAMS -ILLINOIS (1976).
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ship is, of course, the usual and customary way in which attorneys
obtain clients, and such practice is beyond criticism.
More questionable, perhaps, is a common arrangement in which an
attorney provides free legal services to the union or its officers in
return for the referral of all the workmen's compensation cases. This
quid pro quo is beyond the bounds of ethics but is so diffused or
obfuscated that it is seldom detected. A more blatant practice in-
volves vacation houses owned by attorneys which are available for
union leaders and business agents who cooperate.
Frequently, an injured employee "signs up" with a lawyer, even
while the employer or insurance company is paying the medical bills
and the temporary compensation-the full obligations of the statute.
No lawyer can get anything more for the claimant at that time. But,
by filing the case, the lawyer "secures" his fee on any eventual recov-
ery. Any amicable settlement between the employer and employee
becomes impossible because of the attorney's fee. I have asked sev-
eral claimants after the litigation just why they went to a lawyer so
quickly, and the frequent response is, "The business agent told me
that if I didn't get my - over to Blank & Blank right now, he
would never send me out on another job!"
The ability to refer legal business is jealously guarded by some bus-
iness agents and union officials. The unions do not police this area of
conduct on the part of its officials any more than the bar polices the
lawyers. But, as a basic concept, informed union counseling could
save considerable litigation costs to its members, if the Commission's
decision-making processes were comprehensible to the union coun-
selors and to employers instead of being the private preserve of the.
lawyers.
The Lawyers
Most lawyers tend to specialize in cases for the claimant or for the
defense. This was always generally true in metropolitan areas, and
with the vast increase in the number of cases, this specialization has
now spread to even smaller cities in Illinois. From a geographic
standpoint, individual lawyers cover a wide territory. Chicago lawyers
are regularly in attendance in Peoria, Decatur, East St. Louis and
Centralia. The fees are lucrative enough to justify the time and ex-
pense of such traveling. For the defense of claims, employers and
insurance companies with a wide geographic spread may want the
same attorneys traveling throughout the state to represent its com-
mon policy under a state-wide law. However, it is surprising to see
1978]
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Chicago attorneys dominating the plaintiff's docket in Galesburg,
Kankakee, Danville, and Rock Island.
The lawyers compete with each other, but few are critical of the
system; the financial rewards are too satisfying to want to tinker with
it. Defense attorneys are fully employed on hourly or per diem
charges. And a claimant's attorney, even with just a few cases a day,
on a contingent fee of twenty percent of the recovery, is well re-
warded.
The standard twenty percent fee for the claimant's attorney seems
modest in comparison to common law contingent fees of thirty-three
and one-third percent in the personal injury field. But, in contrast to
other personal injury lawyers, the workmen's compensation lawyer
can handle two, three or even fifteen cases in one day. He rarely
spends time or money in legal research, pleading, depositions, filing
or answering motions, or investigation. There is no filing fee. The
only out-of-pocket expense is the medical examination.2 0  His time
usually involves only an initial interview (perhaps), making an ap-
pointment with a doctor, and a telephone or verbal negotiation with
the defense counsel. Even a trial takes less than an hour in ninety
percent of the cases. Prior to 1975, the average trial or settlement
award at the Commission was at least $1100 to $1200.21 Even two or
three such cases at a twenty percent fee produced a rather satisfying
day. Five, eight or more cases produce an even more satisfying day.
Many claimant lawyers have this kind of volume day after day.
Since 1975, with the benefit level more than doubled,2 2 the stan-
dard twenty percent fee produces more than double the amount of
dollars. Small wonder that Chicago lawyers began to invade new ter-
ritories downstate, or that more and more lawyers have entered the
field of workmen's compensation practice. Fear of "no fault" legisla-
tion in itself caused some lawyers to abandon or curtail automobile
cases to enter the field of workmen's compensation. Like an inverse
of Parkinson's Law, the number of filed and litigated cases increased
to accomodate the new participants, from 40,000 in 1974 to 57,000 in
1977.23 Some lawyers became specialists in acquiring the cases, and
others, by referral, in handling the cases. None of this interest by
lawyers is illegitimate or dishonorable. We all (and not just lawyers)
20. It is common practice in Illinois for the attorney to advance this cost. In several states,
Indiana for example, the attorney does not.
21. This is a consensus figure developed on the basis of conversations with attorneys. See
note 3 supra.
22. See text accompanying notes 49-95 supra.
23. See note 14 supra.
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wish to make a living-even a good living. But, no one should as-
sume that the litigation explosion reflects any "accident explosion" in
Illinois. The statistics refute any such conclusion.
The methods of some lawyers for "getting the cases" raise serious
questions. Some extend loans, even pay cash to a claimant for "sign-
ing up." Most defense lawyers have encountered the statement from
opposing counsel, "I can't settle the case for that amount. I've already
loaned the guy-dollars!" About two years ago, a major employer
received eleven identical applications-identical except that each was
filed by a different claimant's attorney. The surprise was that the
claimant had not worked for this company for more than five years.
Of course, this claimant was never seen again; he had already col-
lected through loans and "advancements" from the attorneys when he
signed up.
In the view of many, it is the lucrative lawyers' fees which have
"fueled" the litigation explosion far more than any other factor. 24
The financial interest of plaintiff lawyers is strong indeed. In 1976 and
1977, this group hired a legislative lobbyist to protect this interest in
Springfield. It even started to form a "not for profit" educational as-
sociation to advance the role of lawyers in workmen's compensation
on a tax-deductible basis. One does not question the legitimacy of
anyone advancing any cause in the legislature or engaging in an edu-
cational endeavor. But, the conduct illustrates the depth of lawyer
interest as a factor in the litigation explosion.
The Doctors
The doctors who frequently examine and testify in workmen's com-
pensation cases are hardly responsible for the case load since a lawyer
has already filed the case. But, these doctors are a necessary adjunct
to the process, and any description of the process would be incom-
plete if they were omitted. The law requires each side to submit its
medical report to the other side at least forty-eight hours in advance
of the hearing.2 5 The tremendous increase in litigation results in a
corresponding increased demand for medical examinations and re-
ports.
While many defense attorneys are content with the final report of
the treating doctor and the hospital records, if any, the claimant's
24. The Chicago Daily News, Jan. 28, 1978, col. 1, at 12, in an editorial remarked: "In
Illinois, attorneys are involved in 91% of the cases compared to 10% in Wisconsin. In Illinois,
an arbitrator can grant an attorney up to 20% of his client's total award, compared to 10% in
Wisconsin."
25. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.12 (1977).
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lawyer seldom is. So, a small coterie of specialist doctors has
developed-developed to a degree that many of these doctors do
nothing but examine and testify. New doctors recently were added to
satisfy the increased demand. Their business depends upon writing
reports satisfactory to the lawyers who hire them, and their reports
become more and more extreme in their competition for business.
Naturally, the defense lawyers need doctors to counter the extreme
findings of the plaintiffs' doctors, and so a group of examining and
testifying defense doctors has developed.
The ridiculous extreme has been reached. Certain claimant lawyers
now charter buses - from Mattoon, Champaign, Rockford - to
bring their clients to Chicago for examination by a particular testify-
ing specialist. One doctor examines, takes x-rays, and writes reports
on thirty-five to forty claimants a day (a busload) between 9:00 a.m.
and 3:00 p.m. with some time out to run over to the Industrial
Commission to testify. His reports cover cases ranging from der-
matitis, to laminectomies, to complicated occupational diseases, heart
attacks, and psychiatric problems.
The medical reports, in practice, become part of the pleadings
rather than an aid in finding truth. It is the norm at the Commission
for the plaintiff's medical report to show "50% loss of use of the leg"
and the defense report to show "no evidence of disability." Cases are
frequently settled on the "balance of the terror" imparted by the two
medical reports, for neither has the ring of truth. If the case is tried,
the Commission and its arbitrators can only guess at where the truth
may lie. If they believe a little from each, they give credibility to the
bigger of the two lies. The fact that there are doctors willing to dis-
tort the truth creates disputed questions where none exist. Such doc-
tors are an essential element of the litigation explosion.
Others
A new vocation has developed in the personal injury and work-
men's compensation fields. A claim adjuster for a large insurance
company was recently investigating why an injured employee had not
returned to work, even after the doctor gave him a full release. He
was told by the claimant that he had been making so much money
referring injured persons to attorneys that he had decided to do that
full time and not return to his regular job.
Persons in this vocation carry the forms with them, sign up the
claimant, and then give the papers to an attorney. They are usually
compensated as "investigators" by the attorney. In workmen's com-
pensation, the attorney sometimes does not meet his client until the
[Vol. 27:675
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day of the trial. In addition, there are the taverns in Chicago, Joliet,
Rockford, and many other cities which always have a supply of attor-
neys' business cards. Hospital and ambulance attendants as well as
policemen and doctors make references, frequently for a reward of
some tangible nature.
THE ANTIQUATED SYSTEM IN ILLINOIS
A Purely Adversary System
The Illinois process and procedure in workmen's compensation has
scarcely changed since 1913.26 The provisions of the Act, except for
the dollar figures, are much the same. The revision of 1951, while a
new Act in form, was merely a rearrangement and codification of the
prior law done under an express mandate not to make any changes of
substance or procedure. 27 It is a pure adversary system in the an-
cient, pristine splendor of the 19th century. The Industrial Commis-
sion and its arbitrators have no jurisdiction to enter any kind of order
except as a "dispute" has been submitted to it by the parties, usually
by the attorneys.
Such a system ignores two of the three basic elements of work-
men's compensation benefits: immediate medical attention and im-
mediate payment of temporary total compensation benefits to sustain
the worker and his family during any period of lost time due to the
injury. Inability to receive these benefits at the time can be disas-
trous to the individual involved. Existing procecdures focus on the third
element of benefits, the permanent disability. Lawyers, who have
guided all the amendments to the statute throughout the years, have
seldom bothered with these two vital areas of benefits, for few such
cases reach litigation and provide fees.
In several other states, notably Wisconsin, jurisdiction attaches as
soon as the accident is reported. The administrative agency im-
mediately issues orders for the medical attention and the immediate
payment of temporary total compensation, without the need for attor-
neys or for a hearing. Its jurisdiction continues, even to the point of
assessing the permanent impairment, if any, all without the interven-
tion of lawyers or formal hearings. Only if the employer or employee
disagrees with this on-going process is there a formal hearing. 28
26. The first Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act was passed in 1911 but soon was re-
placed by the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1913.
27. The mandate was from the "agreed bill" committee. See text accompanying notes 96-102
infra.
28. Wis. STAT. § 102 (1977).
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The result is that most injured workers enjoy the full benefits of
the statute under the supervision of the administrative agency, and
never need to employ a lawyer. In fact, unless there is a dispute as to
whether the accident occurred, or a difficult question as to whether
the accident caused a particular disability, there is no issue requiring
legal expertise. The statute is clear as to the weekly rate to be paid
and medical attention is the special province of doctors, not lawyers.
The only issue on which opinions could differ is whether a permanent
impairment exists. Permanent impairment itself is a medical, not a
legal question, which the administrative agency can resolve on the
basis of medical reports with or without the assistance of lawyers
whose only function would be to present those medical reports. Of
course, the Wisconsin system is not favored by lawyers who argue
that only the adversary system protects the rights of the individual.
In the more than 100 amendments to the workmen's compensation
law in 1975, not one amendment diluted in any respect the adversary
system.
But even the adversary system, as we know it in our courts, has
made great strides in reducing litigation. Both the courts (state and
federal) and many administrative agencies have recognized that the
trial of a case should not be a game of "hide and seek," and now have
modern rules of pre-trial discovery, depositions, interrogatories,
notices to admit genuineness of documents, and pre-trial conferences,
all designed to ascertain truth and simplify disputes, thus encouraging
settlements or reducing the time involved in litigation. But none of
these modern advances have touched the Illinois workmen's compen-
sation system.
The Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act has only two minor
means of pre-trial discovery. First, reports of medical examinations
must be submitted forty-eight hours before the hearing if that doc-
tor's testimony is to be presented, 29 and secondly, the deposition of
an out-of-state witness may be taken on order of the Industrial Com-
mission. This procedure is pre-1900 and is still called in the statute a
dedimus potestatem.30 One can subpoena witnesses or records, but
only for the hearing, not for any pre-trial discovery.
Some attorneys do play "hide and seek" with medical reports until
just forty-eight hours before the hearing. The defense does not know
with any certainty what disability is being claimed until that time.
The defense has no time to satisfy itself that the medical report is
29. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.12 (1977).
30. Id. § 138.16.
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accurate or to get authority for any settlement. Or, the employee may
have left the employment or moved to another city; he may or may
not be working elsewhere; he may or may not still be under medical
treatment. Each of these factors may be material in leading to a set-
tlement rather than a trial. But, the defense has no way of finding
out. It cannot even serve a simple interrogatory to find out what kind
of injury will be alleged. So, the case must be tried, and the defense
gets its "discovery" during the trial. It then orders a medical exami-
nation and any other investigation for the appeal hearing where addi-
tional evidence can be presented. 31
An arbitration hearing involves the time and expense of an arbi-
trator, a court reporter, two lawyers, doctors, lay witnesses perhaps,
and considerable clerical work by the Commission staff. It would fre-
quently be an unnecessary expense if the facts were obtainable in
advance. An appeal must then be filed, within fifteen days, 32 while
the facts just discovered at the arbitration hearing are checked out.
The appeal starts another train of clerical work including the prepara-
tion of a costly transcript of the evidence, an expense which would be
saved if there were simple pre-trial discovery as in all other tribunals.
An appeal from the final order of the Commission to the courts is
also a clumsy procedure from the 1890's. Five separate documents
carrying designations such as "Writ of Certiorari" and "Scire Facias"
are required to effect an appeal. 33 Until 1964, when the Illinois Su-
preme Court obtained true rule-making power,34 the ancient "Writ of
Error" was the only means of appealing to the supreme court. Al-
though Illinois has a modern Administrative Procedure Act, 35 it only
applies to such agencies as the legislature may from time to time
designate. Lawyers and labor unions have kept it from being applied
to the Industrial Commission. Illinois also has a modern Administra-
tive Review Act 36 providing for judicial review of administrative
agencies, but it does not apply to Workmen's Compensation Act
cases. Illinois remains in a "dark tunnel," with an antiquated statute
and powerful vested interests seeking to maintain the status quo.
31. Id. § 138.19(e).
32. Id. § 138.19(b).
33. Id. § 138.19(f). The other forms are: Praecipe for Writ of Certiorari, Certificate of Mail-
ing, and Bond on Writ of Certiorari. The Illinois Administrative Review Act requires only a
simple Notice of Appeal, plus a bond, if needed.
34. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 4.
35. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, §§ 1001-1021 (1977). A 1977 amendment to this Act may
render certain provisions applicable, particularly § 1014 requiring a statement of facts and find-
ings of law in all contested cases. P.A. 80-1035 § 1 (1977). It remains to be seen how the
Commission will deal with this law.
36. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 264-279 (1977).
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It is difficult to blame the current Commission and its arbitrators
for faults in a system so legally antiquated. Therefore, nothing in the
next two sections of this Article is designed to be critical of the in-
cumbents who did not create the system. The lack of vision or will to
improve it, however, is a fault shared by many.
The Commission
The administration of the law is given to a Commission consisting
of five persons whose background is restrictively circumscribed. The
statute prescribes:
2 of whom (one from each of the 2 major political parties) shall be
representative citizens of the employing class . . . and 2 of whom
(one from each of the 2 major political parties) shall be representa-
tive citizens of the class of employees . . . and one of whom shall
be a representative citizen not identified with either the employing
or employee classes. . . .7
Except for the bipartisan qualification adopted in 1967, this provision
remains unchanged since 1913. The change was made to bring some
continuity to Commission membership; before this change, a new
Governor usually appointed five new, totally inexperienced commis-
sioners from his party.
Each new commissioner, once appointed, has an ambivalent role:
does he function as a judge under the law, or does he lobby within
the Commission and make adjudications as a continuing advocate of
employers or of employees? Every practicing attorney in this field
will relate that it does make a difference whether Commissioner A or
Commissioner B rules in a particular case, even though each is en-
forcing the identical law. The question is whether individual rights
should be at the mercy of such assignments. The Rule of Law and
respect for law in our society depend upon similar cases being simi-
larly decided. This does not happen when each commissioner pursues
his independent judgment and philosophy.
The effect is violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Con-
stitution. 38 However, no lawyer could prove an equal protection
case without the most exhaustive kind of research analyzing thousands
of cases, for the Commission has never established any standards for
itself or its arbitrators. One cannot prove a deviation from a fair stan-
dard when there is no standard in the first place. One may say that
37. Id. ch. 48, § 138.13.
38. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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this conduct is no different than the differences among judges in the
courts who may have varying predelictions. However, a commissioner
may claim his bias has statutory sanction.
The work of members of the Commission is long and arduous.
They approve settlement agreements, and they hear appeals from the
decisions of the arbitrators. One week of each month, four commis-
sioners fan out throughout the state to hold Hearings on Review (ap-
peal hearings) near the place of the injuries. Over half of the deci-
sions of twenty arbitrators are appealed to a commissioner.39 Each
appeal will, or should, involve reading a somewhat lengthy transcript
of the evidence heard on arbitration, hearing additional evidence, and
listening to oral arguments. The workload is enormous. Because of
the number of appeals, the full Commission sits two to three days a
week just hearing oral arguments.
When over half of the arbitrators' decisions are appealed, it should
be obvious that these "first level" hearings are not really resolving
disputes. The fault here is that of the Commission. First, it has failed
to give directions or standards to the arbitrators to aid them in mak-
ing decisions. Secondly, the variations of philosophy and conduct
among the commissioners themselves make any attorney (for either
side) feel he may do better on appeal just by the luck of the draw
concerning which commissioner is assigned to his case.
The rapid increase in caseload has rendered this system incapable
of performing its function without some changes. But strong, vested,
politically active interests are bent on maintaining the status quo. Any
breath of reform which might affect the lawyers' privileged position is
strongly opposed by both lawyers and labor unions.4 0
The Arbitrators
The arbitrators are the hearing officers at the first level in Indus-
trial Commission proceedings. It is a full-time job and the work is
arduous. The pay is $34,000 a year. There is no special training re-
quired, and none given after an appointment other than to spend one
or two weeks with an experienced arbitrator before starting to hear
cases.
In Chicago, the arbitrators are at work from 8:45 a.m. to 4:45 p.m.
each day, hearing cases most of the time. Downstate, the arbitrators
travel to various cities, sitting one to eight days in each location from
39. See note 3 supra.
40. Why the labor unions identify with the plaintiff lawyers is unknown, but in over 20
years of observation, the author has yet to see any deviation from the alliance between them.
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9:00 a.m. to 4:45 p.m. A court reporter attends with them. They hear
cases three weeks each month and have one week free for administra-
tive duties.
Before 1967, the job of arbitrator was pure patronage. Each time
the Governor changed, all the arbitrators changed, with rare excep-
tions. This always meant a loss of some experienced talent, for as in
our judicial system, patronage did produce some good arbitrators. In
1967, Sentor Arrington sponsored a bill placing arbitrators under civil
service. 41  The incumbents merely had to pass the test to remain in
office, 42 and an eligibility list for future appointments was estab-
lished. 43
The arbitrators must know the rules of evidence, for they apply in
all proceedings. They must also have knowledge of medical terms and
a considerable amount of common sense. Many are well qualified.
But from the decisions, one never knows whether they have these
qualifications or not. Their decisions are stereotyped documents, just
filling in blanks. In the most complicated fact situations, the arbi-
trator's decision contains only the simplistic finding of "sustained an
accident" or "did not sustain an accident," with no discussion or de-
scription of the facts.
Many other administrative agencies at the state and federal level in
disputed cases write a statement of facts or a summary of the evi-
dence and findings of fact and law. 44 The only order received by the
parties at the Industrial Commission is a one-page document reciting
the ultimate statutory findings. From such a document, no one can
tell whether the arbitrator had discerning judgment, noticed particu-
larly significant pieces of evidence, or merely flipped a coin. All deci-
sions look just alike.
Such a shield can conceal incompetence. Worse yet, it permits an
arbitrator to reward friends and punish enemies with little fear of
detection. Attorneys frequently feel that happens, for lack of any logi-
41. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 63b104c(14) (1977). This statute exempts only the Secretary
from the Personnel Code.
42. All except one passed it.
43. The actual testing was bona fide and severe. There was a written examination in legal
and medical areas, and an interview conducted by experts from outside Illinois.
Governors Kerner and Ogilvie followed the civil service law in every respect. Governor
Walker, however, abandoned the testing procedures and made several appointments on the old
patronage basis.
44. Illinois Administrative Procedure Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 1014 (1977). Even the
job specification for Arbitrator states: "4. Writes decisions, involving summarization of material
evidence, statement of findings of fact and conclusions." Ill. Dept. of Personnel, Spec. Code
1850, Position Code 1401 (Dec. 1, 1970).
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cal explanation in the decision. A simple statement of facts or sum-
mary of the evidence in the decisions would make the process more
rational. Illinois is unique in not requiring any such statement from
its hearing officers. 45
Even more puzzling is how arbitrators and commissioners arrive at
the degree of disability, an issue present in almost every decision.
This is the question whether and to what degree a particular part of
the body has suffered a loss of use. In its decisions, the Commission
and the arbitrators merely state the conclusive fact, "25% loss of use
of _ ," and nothing more.
There is no common standard which the twenty arbitrators and five
commissioners share and follow. As a result, similar cases are not
necessarily similarly decided. Awards in virtually identical cases can
vary 300% to 500% in either direction, even though each "trier of
fact" is following an identical law. 46 Attorneys, of course, know the
characteristics of the various arbitrators and do considerable jockeying
to obtain or avoid particular arbitrators. In Chicago, attorneys patrol
the halls to see which arbitrators are occupied or free before deciding
they are ready for trial and stepping up to be assigned. Many decide
the time is not ripe for trial and disappear for a cup of coffee until
different arbitrators are available. This process may repeat itself sev-
eral times a day.
Again, this situation is not the fault of the arbitrators. The Commis-
sion has prescribed no standards for them to follow. To their credit, a
group of arbitrators themselves arranged for advice and counsel from
specialty doctors when faced with the confusion of the new 1975 pro-
vision for partial loss of hearing. 47 Most follow the good advice they
received, although none is bound to do so.
Usually, an administrative agency establishes definitive rules spell-
ing out the details left to it by the legislature. This was not done by
the Illinois Industrial Commission, however. In 1977, the legislature
specifically directed the Commission to make and publish rules "for
determining the extent of disability sustained," 48 an issue present in
almost every case. No action has been taken thus far.
In its own interest, in order to facilitate its own ability to operate
currently, the Commission must break out of its antiquated, passive
45. See note 35 supra.
46. This explains why over half of the arbitrators' decisions are appealed to the full Commis-
sion. Such "variations" among decisions inevitably lead to appeals.
47. Lecture by Dr. M. Reese Guttman, otolaryngologist, arranged by the Arbitrators' As-
sociation (March, 1976).
48. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.16 (1977).
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background. It now has the power to adopt rules for all to follow "for
determining the extent of disability"; if it does so, and follows its own
rules, more and more cases will be settled voluntarily on a fair basis
for all, and its litigation load would become manageable. Simple dis-
covery may or may no.t be within the Commission's rule-making
power, but if an effort were made, most parties would cooperate.
Trials would not have to be undertaken as the only means of finding
out the facts.
The antiquity of the basic law is the responsibility of the legislature
which may have to decide whether to subsidize the adversary system
further or pursue the more economical Wisconsin system. The Com-
mission today is boiling and churning with activity, but falling farther
and farther behind. The legislature should not simply throw more
money at the problem; the problem requires deeper examination.
BENEFIT LEVELS IN THE 1975 LEGISLATION
Thus far, this Article has dealt with the delivery system of Illinois
benefits. We now turn to the level of benefits. The 1975 amendments
to the Illinois workmen's compensation and occupational diseases
laws49 were truly drastic. The costs to Illinois business for these
programs are by far higher than in any other industrial state in the
nation. 50 In theory, workmen's compensation should replace the
economic loss sustained. In Illinois, the benefits far surpass such
losses.
The Weekly Benefit Rate
In 1975, the weekly benefit rate in Illinois went from the level of
$80-$124 per week, depending on the type of claim and the number
of dependents of the employee, to two-thirds of gross wages, subject
to a maximum figure of the "state average weekly wage in manufac-
turing industries." Further, the benefit rate could never be less than
fifty percent of the employee's own wage. 51 Provision was further
made for escalation every two years up to 1981, the maximum rate to
increase to 1331/3% of this "state average weekly wage in manufactur-
ing" in 1977, 1662/3% in 1979, and 200% in 1981.52
49. Id. § 172.36-.54(b).
50. ILLINOIS FISCAL COMMISSION, REPORT ON ECONOMIC AND FISCAL TRENDS IN THE
STATE OF ILLINOIS 14-17 (Dec. 2, 1977).
51. ILL. REV. STAT. clh. 48, § 138.8(b) (1977).
52. Id.
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Some unusual cases arose. Two corporate executives in the $70-
$90,000 income bracket were killed in accidents arising out of and in
the course of their employment. Their widows, both in their thirties,
are now receiving $35-$45,000 tax free per year for the rest of their
lives under the "never less than 50%" provision. This was rather star-
tling, even to the legislators who are covered by the Act also.
Spouses were perhaps becoming more valuable dead than alive. The
never less than 50%" provision was deleted in 1976. 5 3
In 1977, the escalation section was also modified. The first 1331/3%
escalation was permitted, but only in cases of amputations, temporary
total compensation, permanent total disability, and death. The 1979
and 1981 escalations were deleted. For all other types of benefits, the
maximum weekly benefit was "state average weekly wage."' 5 4
Further, the state average weekly wage was to be determined by the
average wage in all employment in Illinois, as computed by the Un-
employment Compensation Bureau, rather than the "state average
weekly wage in manufacturing industries" enacted in 1975.55  The
state average weekly wage is re-examined every six months. By
January 15, 1978, the "state average weekly wage in manufacturing"
had progressed to something over $240 per week. But, the overall
state weekly wage, which is now the standard for determining bene-
fits was $230.05 per week. 56 1331/3% of that standard is $306.73 per
week, which is the current maximum weekly benefit for amputations,
temporary total compensation, permanent total disability, and death.
For all other benefits the maximum is $230.05. 57 It is apparent that
these new maximums are more than twice the weekly maximums in
existence prior to July 1, 1975. While not all employees get the
maximum, by the very definition of "average," more than half of the
Illinois work force is above this average, and the next lower quartile
receives a substantial increase over the prior level. 58
The original premise of workmen's compensation in 1913 was a
"two-thirds of weekly wages" formula.59 Advocates of the 1975 pro-
53. P.A. 79-1450 (1976).
54. P.A. 80-37 (1977).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. As this Article goes to print, the new rates which will be effective July 15, 1978 have
been published. The new state average weekly wage is $241.12; the temporary total rate is
$321.49; the maximum in a death case is $349.60.
58. It should not surprise anyone that the insurance companies increased their insurance
premiums in accordance with these increases in benefits, for these are sums they must pay out
of premiums received.
59. See REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
LAws (August, 1972).
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gram claim that the current benefit is merely the traditional standard.
But, in 1913 there were no deductions for withholding taxes or social
security. The two-thirds formula left considerable incentive for a per-
son to work rather than stay home. Applying the two-thirds formula
today leaves little difference between "take home" pay and work-
men's compensation. Assume a person claiming one exemption at the
following weekly earnings, with the required withholding for federal
and state income taxes plus social security.60
Weekly Earnings Take Home Pay Workmen's Compensation
$100.00 $ 79.75 $100.00 61
200.00 149.46 133.33
300.00 213.54 200.00
460.10 304.26 306.73
If one deducts from these "take home" figures the further expense of
getting to and from work, lunch money, work clothes, and union
dues, it is apparent that workmen's compensation provides as much
spendable income as does working, and leaves no financial incentive
to return to work.
The claim that the current benefit levels follow the original con-
cepts of workmen's compensation is a fiction. Current benefits should
be a percentage of "take home" pay, not gross wages, to be compara-
ble to the initial philosophy.
Death Benefits
Prior to the amendments of July 1, 1975, the amounts payable in
death cases ranged from $10,250 for a widow with no children to
$34,485 for a widow with four or more children.6 2 These limits were
replaced with the lifetime benefits at the weekly rates set forth in the
preceding section-a maximum of $306.73 per week, or about
60. See DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, EMPLOYER'S TAX
GUIDE (Circular E Supp. 1977).
61. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.8(b)l (1977). This is an aberration beyond logical explana-
tion.
62. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.7(b) (1977). Specifically, the amounts were as follows:
Min. Max.
Widow and no children 10,250 24,624
Widow and one child 11,200 26,220
Widow and two children 11,540 28,728
Widow and three children 12,830 31,179
Widow and four or more children 12,830 34,485
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$16,000 annually. And the minimum became six years of compensa-
tion, or $115,000 even if the recipient was actually dependent for
only one day. 63
No one would deny that the prior death benefits were inadequate.
However, it is also true that the new benefit levels represent a dras-
tic increase. Workmen's compensation awards, at least for younger
widows, are now in excess, in many instances, of what juries award in
cases of death arising from negligent actions. Workmen's compensa-
tion is no longer a system of limited liability.
The 1977 legislature amended the death benefits section to provide
that the maximum payable in any case is $250,000 or twenty years of
compensation, "whichever is greater."6 4  However, twenty years of
compensation for persons at the maximum rate is $319,000 (twenty
years at $306.73 per week). For the highly paid employee, the
$250,000 maximum was obsolete when enacted!
The weekly payments are the same amount, irrespective of the
number or type of dependents. The weekly rate, once established, is
not reduced as long as any dependent is alive or eligible. Change in
family circumstances or reduction in the number or age of depen-
dents never affects it. In fact, it increases annually for inflation as the
"state average weekly wage" increases. 65 This produces some curious
results. For example, if the only dependent is one minor child, the
benefits continue until the child reaches age eighteen, or twenty-five
if the child is enrolled in any accredited educational institution. 66 A
single child, therefore, as the only dependent, can receive $16,000 a
year while going to school, even through graduate school. He may
make more while in school than on his first job!
On the general principle that workmen's compensation should be
"compensatory for the loss," this is clear overcompensation; the de-
ceased parent would never have given the child $16,000 a year for his
college education, if indeed, he financed his college education at all.
Should the employer be required to do more than the deceased par-
ent? Does the new law replace the loss or grant a windfall?
As to surviving widows or children, there is additional income from
social security which, in combination with the workmen's compensa-
tion benefits, frequently produces gross annual income on a tax-free
63. Id. ch. 48, § 138.7-.8.
64. id. § 138.8(b)4.2.
65. Id. § 138.8(g). Employers and insurance companies are assessed one half of one percent
of their compensation payments each year for the Compensation Rate Adjustment Fund. The
State Treasurer, not the employer or insurance company, makes the payment. Id.
66. Id. § 138.7(a).
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basis well in excess of the actual net wages of the decedent. The
death is financially more beneficial for the rest of the family than if
the decedent had lived.
The report of the National Commission on State Workmen's Com-
pensation Laws, which the advocates of the 1975 legislation said they
were following, recommended that the amount of workmen's com-
pensation benefits be offset to the extent of any social security pay-
ments. 67 The Illinois legislature did just the opposite; workmen's
compensation benefits are in addition to social security payments.
Opinions vary as to what should be the proper level of benefits in
death cases. It seems beyond question, however, that the level of
benefits should be related to the number of dependents and to the
reasonable expectations of the dependents from the decedent had
there been no death. 68
Permanent Total Disability Benefits
The level for permanent total disability benefits has increased in
much the same way as the death benefits. The maximum weekly
benefit is 1331/3% of the state average weekly wage. 69 The benefits
continue throughout the lifetime of the individual. If he dies from the
same condition involved in the accident, it is arguable that these
benefits continue for his widow and children.
In addition to the workmen's compensation benefits, all true cases
of permanent total disability receive social security benefits. The total
compensation shall not exceed eighty percent of the employee's gross
earnings prior to the disability. If this ceiling is reached, social se-
curity gets the reduction, not the employer. Of course, eighty per-
cent of gross earnings on a tax-free basis is far better income than
taxable wages from working.
Needless to say, benefits at this level are tempting to many per-
sons. Frustrations with a job, inability to live up to a self-imposed
image or to an image demanded by a spouse, parents, or anyone else,
tempts a person to look for an excuse for non-performance, but with-
67. THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
LAws 73 (July, 1972).
68. The writer recently received the following case to defend. In a two-week period, a
65-year-old employee married a 19-year-old girl (the daughter of his neighbor), took his retire-
ment pension, and filed a workmen's compensation claim for an occupational disease. If the
employee can win this case, he will "speak from the grave" for a very long time at his
employer's expense. His 19-year-old wife may well receive 50 years of support from the
employer, something she never would have received from her 65-year-old spouse.
69. As of January 15, 1978, the maximum weekly benefit was $306.73.
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out any financial sacrifice. Workmen's compensation gives just that.
In fact, the financial rewards for not working are greater than for
working.
The threat of an award of the tremendous sums involved in these
lifetime benefits naturally frightens employers and insurance com-
panies. The fear is real in that the Illinois Industrial Commission has
shown little restraint in awarding permanent total disability whenever
a claimant complains enough and stays away from work, even with a
paucity of objective findings of disability. Attorneys know this, of
course, and frequently advise a claimant to stay home if he wants a
bigger settlement or award.
Temporary Total Compensation
Temporary total disability is defined as that period necessary to
restore a person to work status, or to the point where further medical
treatment will not improve his condition. It might be described as
the "period of the healing process."70 1.
The new level of benefits, two-thirds of actual wages, 71 received on
a tax-free basis, has considerably increased the length of the period of
temporary total incapacity. The employee can stay home and be fi-
nancially as well off as when he works. All he needs is the coopera-
tion of his doctor, selected, of course, by him. For example, before
July 1, 1975, the author observed that the average lost time period
for a hernia operation was six to eight weeks. Now the average is ten
to fourteen weeks. This lengthening of the period is an additional cost
of the new law, not reflected in the increases in weekly rates.
Further, there was formerly a limitation of sixty-four weeks on the
period of temporary total incapacity. 72 Any payments made after
sixty-four weeks were applied against the permanent disability. The
1975 amendments removed any limitation on the number of weeks
for temporary total disability, 73 so it can go on for life. 74  Whether
called "temporary total" or "permanent total," the discussion of per-
70. Mount Olive Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 295 111. 429, 431, 129 N.E. 103, 104
(1920).
71. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.8(b) (1977). The maximum for temporary total compensa-
tion benefits is now $306.73. Before July 1, 1975, this maximum was $100.90 to $124.30 de-
pending upon the number of dependents.
72. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.8(b) (1973).
73. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.8(b) (1977).
74. The free choice of doctor provision enacted in 1975 is also responsible for longer periods
of treatment and longer periods of temporary total compensation. See text accompanying notes
92-95 supra.
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manent total disability, above, is applicable to the temporary total
type of benefit. The weekly rate is the same, no matter how it is
categorized.
Permanent Partial Disability
It may seem contradictory to state that the lesser injuries are the
major problem in Illinois. But this is the most expensive cost item in
Illinois workmen's compensation, the most lucrative area for claim-
ants' attorneys, and the most confusing area in workmen's compensa-
tion administration. 75 Almost by definition, the permanent partial dis-
ability case presents a lesser injury than death, permanent total or
major amputations. The employee has returned to work at his regular
job. The question presented is whether he has a permanent loss of
use of some part of his body as a result of the injury. While some
such injuries are of a serious nature, many involve minor scratches,
incidental bruises or inconsequential fractures. In many other states
these are described as "accidents without injury."
There is seldom any economic impact upon the employee as a re-
sult of the injury. His medical bills have been paid; if he lost time
from work, he has received the equivalent of his take home pay on a
tax-free basis; he has returned to his regular work at regular wages.
But, in Illinois this is the largest single area of benefits and attorney
fees, and, therefore, the lawyers' favorite playground. There are, of
course, several hundred such cases for every death or amputation.
A tradition of hospitality has existed at the Industrial Commission
with the corollary that anyone who has graced the Commission's halls
should not leave empty-handed. Nothing heals without leaving disa-
bility or disfigurement in Illinois. In my own twenty-seven years ex-
perience, I recall when fractures did heal leaving no disability. To-
day, any fracture is deemed by the Commission to be at least a
twenty to thirty percent loss of use of the fractured part of the body.
If it has healed without any disability, it may be twenty percent; if
there is anything slightly observable, it is at least thirty percent.
This is partly the result of the patronage heritage of the Commis-
sion. Each administration appointed by a new Governor wanted to
show it could do more for the injured working man than did the last
75. According to the data compiled by one major insurance company, this type of case
represented more than 97% of the filed cases prior to July 1, 1975. It represented more than
85% of the workmen's compensation "paid-out" dollar. It was estimated that death benefits took
only 2%, temporary total about 6%, and medical costs about 6% of the paid-out workmen's
compensation dollar. No current figures are available. See note 3 supra.
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one. So, a fracture which was formerly nothing began to become five
percent, then ten percent and on up to the present level.
It is also the result of lazy defense counsel and claims departments
over the years who will always pay something rather than expend the
energy and cost of a trial. In times when fractures did heal without
disability, some companies would pay five percent of the particular
member rather than have a trial. It is not surprising that when com-
missioners found themselves approving settlement agreements for five
percent even when there was no disability, they felt that they should
award at least five percent in any tried case since so many companies
were paying that. Once this level was established, the same lazy de-
fense counsel and claim departments began to pay ten percent rather
than face a trial. The commissioners followed suit and now the level
for a "no disability fracture" is at least twenty percent of the member
involved. This has been an inflation within the initial inflation caused
by legislatively mandated increases in the weekly benefits.
A set of other "standards" has grown in the Commission. For
example, a fractured oscalcis is worth (at least) thirty-five percent loss
of use of the foot, a fractured rib produces five to ten percent loss of
use of an arm, a cartilage operation is worth thirty percent loss of use
of the leg. One learns these "standards" only by being associated with
the Commission for they are never printed or published in any man-
ner.
The fallacy of these "standards" is that compensation is being
awarded or paid in settlement based upon the initial type of injury,
not on the residual "permanent partial loss of use" as the statute di-
rects. Some persons are even undercompensated since no one actu-
ally looks carefully at their current condition of disability but only at
the initial injury. Most, however, are overcompensated.
In the handling of these cases attorneys engage in ceremonial
dances. First, the employee is sent to one of the claimants' stable of
examining physicians with the aim of getting a medical report which
shows gross restrictions of motion, tendonitis, tenosynovitis, and any
other "-itis" which the claimant doctor's imagination can conjure. If
possible, the doctor attempts to transform a finger injury into a hand
involvement, or a hand into an arm involvement, for the greater the
member involved, the more potential compensation is available.
On receipt of the claimant's medical report, the employer sends
him to one of his stable of doctors in the hope of getting a report
which states that there is "no objective sign of disability." Then, the
two attorneys may examine the particular claimant and his injury
themselves, or. the arbitrator does so, and somewhere a guess comes
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out as a settlement or award, without regard to which doctor, if
either, stated the truth.
The cost of this ceremonial dance often expands to a point where it
may exceed the value of the disability, if any. (For example, a medi-
cal examination with x-ray may cost from $40 to $150.) This renders a
rational settlement difficult. Both attorneys, of course, now have a
legitimate claim for attorney's fees. An arbitrator knows of these ex-
penses and adjusts the amount of his award to cover them and still
leave something for the employee.
Has this ceremonial dance and its expense done anything for the
employee or the employer except increase the expenses for each of
them? Neither of them probably had any disagreement with the treat-
ing doctor and his findings. Does a "system" such as this benefit any-
one other than the attorneys and the doctors involved? How much
better it might be if the Commission adopted standards which were
known and published. Then, in accordance with the basic premises of
law, the parties might well agree upon an appropriate settlement be-
tween themselves without the necessity of going to attorneys or to
the Industrial Commission for litigation.
Lack of true standards plus the desire for fees encourage this litiga-
tion and expense. The author often has been confronted with the
statement from opposing counsel, "the Company made a fair offer to
this man, but I can't settle for that; I would not have done anything
to justify a fee." So, the case has to be tried even though an acknowl-
edged fair offer of settlement has been made. And somehow, the
employer's "fair offer" gets conveyed to the arbitrator who feels he
must award more than the employer offered, "because everybody
knows that the employer was trying to get off as cheap as possible!"
Or he exceeds the employer's offer just to keep the claimant's attor-
ney from looking bad. Perhaps the employer only wanted to save the
expense of ceremonial examinations and attorney fees by making this
"fair offer," but the system frustrates any "fair offer" approach by in-
creasing the cost, no matter how fair the offer was. Why should the
employer or insurance company try to be fair at all if the result is a
larger payment?
The National Commission on State Workmen's Compensation Laws
in its 1972 report stated that permanent partial benefits are "the most
controversial and complex aspect of workmen's compensation. We
were impressed during our hearings and meetings that for no other
class of benefits are there more variations among the States or more
divergence between statutes and practices." 76 But it ducked the
76. THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
LAws 66 (July, 1972).
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problem. "Nonetheless, we have concluded that the issue is as in-
tractable that we would do a disservice to make precise recommenda-
tions for the restructuring of permanent partial benefits on the basis
of the time for analysis that was available to us." 77 While making no
specific recommendations in this area, some did insist upon the fol-
lowing statement in the Report bearing on the central problem of
evaluating permanent partial disability: "A basis for rational evaluation
of injury or disease is the recently published American Medical As-
sociation's Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment." 78
While the legislature also avoided action in this area (rather the
lawyers and labor unions did not include it in their 1975 package),
one of its commissions reported under Suggested Legislation as fol-
lows: "The Industrial Commission would be required to adopt stan-
dards for evaluating impairment in cases of permanent partial injuries
such as the American Medical Association's Guides to the Evaluation
of Permanent Impairment."79 This legislative commission further
published a table showing how Illinois found a disability when other
states did not. 80
Percent of Cases Awarding Permanent Trial
Compensation
Type of Case California Florida Wisconsin Illinois
Permanent Partial Award
with no Temporary
Total Payable 20% 22% 11% 53%
Permanent Partial Award
with less than $200
Medical Payments 12% 12% 17%- 60%
This table demonstrates again that injuries which heal in California,
Florida and Wisconsin do not heal in Illinois!
While the AMA Guides may not answer all of the possible
hypothetical questions arising in the area of permanent partial im-
pairment, they do cover seventy to eighty percent of the recurring
77. Id. at 67. According to one member's conversation with the author, however, the Na-
tional Commission avoided the "permanent partial" issue not because the problem was so in-
tractable, but because it wanted a unanimous report. If it had faced up to the problem, it would
have alienated the union representatives and attorneys among the members of the Commission.
78. Id. at 69.
79. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION INSURANCE SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE ILLINOIS INSURANCE
LAWs STUDY COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT 52 (February, 1977).
80. Id. at 41.
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kinds of disability. 8' A reduction of litigation in seventy to eighty
percent of the Commission docket would be a real achievement. With
these AMA Guides, an employer or insurance company would know
what he ought to offer an employee for an injury. An employee could
find out from his family doctor whether or not he is getting a fair deal
for a fee of twenty dollars instead of a twenty percent attorney's fee.
If the degree of permanent partial impairment were based upon fair
standards and honest medical findings, awards would not vary from
arbitrator to arbitrator or from arbitrator to Commission. Cases would
be amicably adjusted without hearings, because of the certainty of
result. The litigation explosion would be easily handled.
In fact, most cases involve only the question of the extent of dis-
ability. Do lawyers bring any essential skill to such a question? Isn't it
a medical, not a legal question? No one can deny that lawyers are
necessary in the current antiquated system. The problem is the sys-
tem, not the lawyers, except as the lawyers rather unanimously, out
of sincere self-interest, oppose any changes.
We have a very expensive system to determine very minor dis-
putes such as whether a finger has twenty percent or twenty-five per-
cent impairment. The expense is not justifiable to the injured
employee, to the employer, or to the taxpayers who pay the commis-
sioners and arbitrators. Any improvement here would mean marked
improvement on the heavy docket of the Industrial Commission for
cases of this category represent the vast majority of the total number
of cases.
Unjustifiable Discrimination in
Permanent Partial Disability Cases
The current statutory scheme contains gross discriminations in
permanent partial disability. For example, the statute has a specific
provision awarding twenty weeks of compensation for a fractured
nose.8 2 This is the number of weeks awarded whether the fracture
heals well or poorly and whether any disfigurement shows or not.
Assume a fractured nose suffered by a truck driver who earns $350
per week and one by a waitress who earns $150 per week. The truck
driver receives twenty weeks of compensation at two-thirds of his
wages, at least $230.05 per week or a total of $4,601. The waitress
receives $100 for twenty weeks or a total of $2,000. Yet the fractured
nose may have far greater economic impact upon the waitress if it
81. See note 75 supra.
82. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.8(d) (1977).
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affects her appearance than it has on the truck driver. Why should he
get more than twice what she gets? There is no rational justification
for one to receive more than twice as much as the other. Yet, this
invidious discrimination exists, as a matter of law, under the Illinois
statute.
Our statute fails to discriminate in its benefit structure in terms of
the needs to be met. For anyone making less than $345.08 per week,
the weekly rate is the same, whether paid for the temporary total, a
permanent total period, for death or permanent partial disability. Yet
the needs are vastly different. In the first three areas, the breadwin-
ner is not working, and the benefit paid should be measured by what
he and his family need to sustain their standard of living. In the area
of permanent partial disability, the employee has returned to work at
his regular job. His needs bear no relation to family sustenance. Yet,
the weekly benefit rate is the same in both situations.
Several more enlightened industrial states have recognized the fal-
lacy in having the same weekly benefits for such unrelated needs. In
the following table, Column A shows the rate for death, temporary
total and permanent total, and Column B shows the rate for perma-
nent partial:
A B
Indiana $120 $60
Wisconsin 2/3 of wages 57
Missouri 95 80
Michigan 144 none
New York 125 95
California 154 70
Ohio 2/3 of wages 98
Illinois 2/3 of wages 2/3 of wages
or $306.73 or $230.05
As pointed out before, lawyers get most of their fees from this per-
manent partial area and strongly oppose any reduction.
Pre-existing Disabilities
Pre-existing conditions have been a blurred field at the Commis-
sion. Prior to 1975, there was a general premise that "the employer
takes the employee as he is," and therefore was responsible for the
total amount of disability following an injury unless some prior condi-
tion of disability could be proved in a definitive manner. 83 The 1975
83. Caterpillar Tractor v. Industrial Comm., 33 Ill. 2d 78, 210 N.E.2d 215 (1965).
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amendments expressly provided that any prior condition could not be
taken into account in rendering any current award of disability unless
that condition had been paid for under the Illinois Workmen's Com-
pensation Act. 84
Consequently, for a severe impairment suffered in an automobile
accident, or any accident in any other state, or for a disease or a birth
defect, the Commission was forbidden to take it into consideration.
The employer pays as if it had never happened, even though the
employee may have gotten a $500,000 jury verdict for the earlier dis-
ability. Consequently, if an employer hires a handicapped person or
has one on his payroll, he takes the risk that in the event of an injury
to that person, he will not pay just for the effect of that injury, but
for the sum total of disability for the employee's lifetime. 85
The invidious nature of this amendment is best described by con-
sidering an injury to an eye. Formerly, one could show the visual
acuity before and after the accident and pay only the difference (the
added impairment). The 1975 amendment abolished this; the prior
condition can be taken into consideration only if compensation has
been paid for the prior condition. 86  This change in 1975, coupled
with the Industrial Commission's peculiar standard on loss of vision,
produces incredible paradoxes. Loss of vision is one area where the
Industrial Commission has had a published standard. 87 According to
this published standard, any visual acuity worse than 20/200 is con-
sidered total blindness. Whether the visual loss is correctible by glasses
is immaterial; only naked vision is considered.
Consider the situation of a person whose naked vision is 20/300 in
each eye, but is fully correctible to 20/20, and who has no other ocu-
lar problems involving the field of vision, eye motility, or anything
else. If that person gets something in an eye as the result of an acci-
dent while employed, an evaluation of his naked vision will be "in-
dustrial blindness" at the Illinois Industrial Commission, and he can
collect 100% loss of use of the eye. At the maximum weekly rate of
$230.05, he receives $34,507.50, just for getting something in his
eye.
84. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.8(e)17 (1977).
85. "Prior conditions" include hypertension, heart problems, diabetes and the like, found in
a good number of good people who need jobs. The increasing tendency of the Commission (and
the supreme court) to find strokes and heart attacks compensable inhibits the employment op-
portunities of such persons.
86. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.8(e)17 (1977).
87. It is called the Wisconsin standard even though Wisconsin abandoned it in 1927 and
now uses the standard set forth in the AMA Guides. Basically, it is the old Snellen Chart,
measuring visual acuity on the 20/20 basis-naked vision only, without regard to its correctibil-
ity with glasses.
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If that sounds ridiculous, consider that if he gets something in both
eyes in this accident, then he will have total blindness in both eyes.
Compensation will then not be just twice the $34,507.50, but perma-
nent total disability under a special definition in the Act 88 stating that
100% loss of use of two or more members (which includes the eye) is
a permanent total disability for life. Total disability has a weekly rate
of $306.73. At twenty years of life expectancy, $306.73 per week is
just under $319,000! And he can draw this money while continuing to
work at any level of earnings he can command, and even after he
retires. What an absurdity! Correctible vision is much less serious
than uncorrectible defects. Yet Illinois compensates both the same.
At the same session of the Legislature, a statute was enacted grant-
ing the Illinois Fair Employment Practices Commission authority to
enforce a statutory prohibition against discrimination in respect to hir-
ing the handicapped. 89 This and the workmen's compensation provi-
sion regarding pre-existing disabilities work at cross purposes with
each other. The current situation is grossly unfair to employers and
inhibits the employment opportunities of the handicapped. It puts a
potential $15,000 to $30,000 liability on hiring a handicapped person
compared to other job applicants. For the employer, it is another
"heads you lose, tails you lose" position.
Is it any wonder that vocational counselors have difficulty finding
jobs for the handicapped? Is it any surprise that employers and insur-
ance companies have reduced their activities in Illinois?
Partial Loss of Hearing - New in 1975
Prior to July 1, 1975, compensation was awarded only for total loss
of hearing, not any partial loss. The 1975 amendment was simple; it
allowed recovery for a partial loss of hearing, without giving any more
specific guidelines. 90 The complexities of this simple legislative
change are enormous. Coupled with the change about pre-existing
conditions, it exposes every employer in Illinois to the immediate
payment of the lifetime accumulation of hearing problems of all
employees in Illinois.
There is the further complexity of just how hearing loss is mea-
sured. There are standards under the federal OSHA legislation that
are identical to the AMA Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Par-
88. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.8(e)18 (1977).
89. Id. § 853 (1977). See also Id. ch. 38, § 13.2.
90. Id. ch. 48, § 138.8(e)16.
91. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.95 (1977).
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tial Impairment,9 1 but there are no standards in the statute or at the
Industrial Commission. No one knows what to expect.
Employers and the underwriters for insurance companies are left to
guess just how loss of hearing will be evaluated by the Illinois Indus-
trial Commission. For example, what does a loss of twenty-five deci-
bels mean in Illinois in terms of impairment? Under the recognized
standards, only losses in excess of twenty-five decibels are considered
to be a loss of hearing. Only losses at the frequencies of 500, 1000
and 2000 are considered in determining the degree of loss. Only a
noise level in excess of ninety decibels is considered as "harmful
noise." 92 What if the Industrial Commission or one of its arbitrators
or commissioners decides to measure loss at the frequency of 8000, a
loss which can be measured even though such hearing is usually
found only in dogs and rare "hi-fi" enthusiasts?
One insurance company cancelled insurance on a forging shop im-
mediately. Its underwriters determined that there might well be an
accumulated average loss equal to $6,000 per employee in this 300-
man shop unless the Commission adopted some sensible standard.
There was no way it could charge a premium consistent with that risk
under insurance regulations, and, if it could, it would bankrupt the
employer.
There are also constitutional problems involved in holding any
employer responsible for a hearing loss incurred prior to the change
in the law of July 1, 1975. This will be the subject of extensive litiga-
tion; it is a subject which the legislature could have dealt with at the
time, and thereby have avoided the extensive and expensive litigation
which will now ensue.
One may ask about the magnitude of the hearing loss problem.
Well, one major employer in Illinois has 400 cases pending with no
intelligible means of knowing its potential cost.
Complications of Free Choice of Doctor
"Free choice" is a code phrase connoting all things good and fair in
our society. However, the "free choice of doctor" provision that was
added to the Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act in 1975 has dras-
tically complicated and impaired the delivery of sound medical care
to injured employees. 93 First, no employee can keep a doctor on tap
for any accident which may happen. Only the employer is in a posi-
tion to furnish prompt medical attention. Second, the employer or
92. Id.
93. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.8(a) (1977).
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the insurance company can (and does) arrange for a better quality of
patient care than most employees can command on their own. Third,
the employer has a direct financial interest in providing quality medi-
cal care in order to regain the services of a valuable employee and
minimize his workmen's compensation payments.
The 1975 legislation excludes the employer from having anything to
say about the medical care of an injured employee; he just pays the
cost of whatever medical care the employee seeks. While the Com-
mission can control this medical care, who can call it to the Commis-
sion's attention? The employer does not even know who is treating
his employee until the expense is already incurred.
There are, of course, valid arguments against the old system in
which the employer had sole control of medical care, and any
employee who sought his own medical treatment did so at his own
expense. However, the experience under this new system is worse.
The prompt payment of temporary total benefits at the time such
benefits are really needed is drastically slowed for lack of proper med-
ical documentation to support the issuance of checks. While the new
law requires a doctor to furnish medical reports to the employer upon
written request, 94 the doctor frequently does not do so and there is
no means of forcing him to do so. The employer frequently does not
know who is treating the employee in order even to make any such
request.
The employee's own doctor is seldom acquainted with the
employee's work place, and there is no coordination between his re-
covery, the accommodation of a temporary disability to possible job
openings, or any progress reports concerning the employee's health.
The employer does not know whether to seek a temporary or perma-
nent replacement.
Some employees use the new law as a license to go "doctor shop-
ping." There are actual instances, for example, where an employee
states he has a back complaint. His first doctor, of course, believes
his complaints, takes a full set of x-rays, advises heat and therapy,
and after two weeks concludes that there is nothing wrong and re-
leases the employee to return to work. The employee, either because
his back still hurts, or he wants to do things other than return to
work, goes to a second doctor. The second doctor, to protect himself
against potential malpractice, undertakes the same procedures as the
first doctor and two weeks later releases the employee to return to
work. In my own experience, I have seen this process go through five
and six doctors. The employer gets five or six medical bills virtually
94. Id.
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identical in content for the repetitive procedures. In the meantime,
the employee is off work for ten to twelve weeks. Medical and weekly
benefit costs can pyramid.
The employer is powerless to influence the employee's course of
action, and usually is not even aware of the employee's actions until
after it has all taken place when he gets the bill. As for the employee,
he eventually falls into the hands of a doctor (sometimes recom-
mended by his lawyer) who proposes more radical treatment.
(Surgery always increases the value of a case.) Such employees fre-
quently end up with a laminectomy, and afterward still have the same
complaints they had at the beginning. Modern medicine suggests a
second opinion before surgery; it does not happen in workmen's
compensation.
There are other instances of employees spending six months, three
times a week, in chiropractic treatment with no change in symptoms
or complaints. This is not to disparage chiropractors who frequently
show good results from their treatment, and who frequently get
employees back to work in two or three weeks. But, if symptoms
persist for six months, further chiropractic treatment is unlikely to
change those symptoms and complaints even though the heat and
massage are comforting. In the meantime, the employer or the insur-
ance company pays, pays, and pays.
There are numerous instances of doctors simply catering to the de-
sires of the patient rather than recognizing any independent medical
responsibility. For example, one company received a "return to light
work" letter from a treating doctor and placed the employee as a
guard at a railroad crossing inside the plant. But this job paid $7.00
an hour instead of his former $8.00 an hour, which the employee did
not like. (His tax-free workmen's compensation was more satisfactory.)
The following day, the company received another letter from the doc-
tor stating he was not capable of returning to "light work." The
employee and the doctor were in different cities, seventy miles apart,
and the second letter was not the result of any examination or treat-
ment by that doctor but of a telephone call from the employee stating
he did not want to go back to work. The doctor accommodated his
patient.
While the employer does have the right to request a medical
evaluation at any time, 95 he does not have the right to interfere with
treatment in any way. If he regards the further treatment as unneces-
sary and refuses to pay the bills or to pay further temporary total
95. Id. § 138.12.
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compensation, he runs the risk that the Industrial Commission,
perhaps one year later, will second guess him, hold his refusal im-
proper, and subject him to penalties. From the employer's
standpoint, it is another dilemmatic situation.
There should be provision for prior notice to the employer of any
radical treatment and an interim hearing by the Commission concern-
ing the adequacy or necessity of the medical treatment. In the pres-
ent system, even the mechanics of setting up such a hearing would
take four to eight weeks, and will not solve the current dilemma of
the employer or the employee, particularly when an eager surgeon
has already scheduled the operation.
Free choice of doctor might work well if the Illinois procedure be-
came administrative, even paternalistic, with medical reports being
submitted directly to the Commission, and with the right in it to
supervise the medical treatment. However, Illinois has no procedure
for day-to-day supervision of these matters as they occur. Ours is a
pure adversary system! This is in contrast to the workmen's compen-
sation administration in other states, particularly Wisconsin, which
has free choice of doctor but under supervision. 96 The employee
must, at the very least, get approval of the Commission to change
doctors, and a second opinion before radical surgery can be com-
pelled.
The new free choice of doctor provision in the 1975 amendments
has not improved the quality of medical care for employees; it has,
however, greatly increased the expense and the complexity for
employers and insurance companies. Unresolved are the following
questions: What if the employee decides he wants to be treated with
goats' intestines in Switzerland or with transcendental meditation in
India? What is the employer's obligation? The Commission should
adopt some rules before these situations arise.
THE LEGISLATURE AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
Few issues bring out more intensity and combativeness in the
Illinois Legislature than a workmen's compensation issue. The legis-
lators get such pressure that they end up resenting the whole subject
of workmen's compensation. For years, they relied upon the agreed
bill process to solve the problem for them. Since the inception of
workmen's compensation laws in Illinois, there had been an agreed
bill process, and until 1975, no workmen's compensation amendments
ever passed except through that process.
96. WiS. STAT. § 102.13 (1977).
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What was this agreed bill process? Until the Walker administration
in Illinois, 1973-1977, it was a conference convened on the call of the
Governor and the Chairman of the Industrial Commission. Represen-
tatives of the employers and of labor attended, as did members of the
House and Senate labor committees. After initial flowery speeches,
labor and management nominated three to five persons as its
negotiators who then met in private sessions. Usually, these
negotiators reached an agreement about the changes in the law,
drafted the legislation, and submitted it to the legislature where it
passed without any dissent. All legislators who voted for it received a
gold star for the particular vote on their voting record from both
management and labor.
Sometimes, the negotiators could not reach any agreement. Years
ago when this occurred, members of the legislature would begin to
attend the sessions and frequently were able to conciliate the parties
into an agreed bill. In recent years, however, no legislators have at-
tended the negotiating sessions.
The agreed bill process did provide a forum in which each side had
to put forth its requests and justify on some rational basis the reasons
for its requested changes. Such a forum is essential in dealing with a
fairly complicated law. No substitute forum was established when
labor abandoned the agreed bill process in 1975. The agreed bill pro-
cess had certain deficiencies. Management and labor were primarily
concerned with the dollars involved, and little else. In fact, as dead-
lines for action approached, the dollars became the only subject dis-
cussed. And, since the agreement was usually reached only late in
the session, the legislation seldom concerned itself with anything
else. Any other ideas to improve the Industrial Commission or its
administration fell to the side.
We negotiators (the author was one of them for many years) were
also the practicing lawyers at the Illinois Industrial Commission. The
position gave us some prestige with our clients and with the commis-
sioners and arbitrators; their salaries were fixed in the Workmen's
Compensation Act, and they were dependent upon the negotiators for
any increases in salaries. Each of us "knew our way around the
Commission," understood its variable processes, and were not con-
cerned that, to others, these processes were unfathomable. We
negotiators had the inside track. A wider forum in which legislators
and other experts participated might have discussed procedures and
included the interest of the public. But there was no such forum. The
agreed bill process was the only game in town, and so we played it.
Over the years, the agreed bill process did not serve Illinois badly.
Illinois benefits were always in the upper ten percent among all the
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states. During the many years of Republican domination of the legis-
lature, particularly the Senate, it was most unlikely that labor could
have gotten anything more than it got under the agreed bill process.
Then came Watergate. In the first post-Watergate election of 1974,
the Democrats and labor obtained absolute control of the Illinois
legislature. With this power, labor refused even to meet with rep-
resentatives of the employers. Labor had its committed votes from
November, 1974. It introduced the drastic bill of 1975 which passed
both houses without a period or a comma being changed. Its drastic
provisions were not even discussed in committee hearings despite val-
iant efforts by a few legislators. Labor told the legislators that its bill
simply represented the recommendations of the National Commission
on State Workmen's Compensation Laws. This was far from the truth,
but labor never had to explain anything in the bill beyond "we need
to follow these recommendations to keep the federal government
from taking over this important state function."
In fact, the 1975 legislation went far beyond the national recom-
mendations. The National Commission estimated that if all of its
recommendations were adopted in Illinois, insurance rates might in-
crease by twenty-six percent. 97 Already the Department of Insur-
ance has approved an eighty-eight percent increase in insurance pre-
miums, three times the estimate of the National Commission. 98
The eighty-eight percent does not reflect the kind of increased
premiums employers actually are paying. The insurance industry is
frightened about the risks it is undertaking. Through changes of clas-
sifications and other means, the industry has won effective premium
increases two to three times the rates in effect just prior to July 1,
1975. If an insurance company could not get this kind of premium, it
simply refused to write the policy at all.
The insurance increases through 1977 were based solely on the
legal changes in the statute. A request for another twenty-five per-
cent increase has been filed in 1978 because insurance company ex-
perience has shown that Industrial Commission awards and medical
costs are higher than was anticipated from the statutory changes. This
twenty-five percent increase is pending before the Insurance De-
partment. 99
97. THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
LAWS 143 (July, 1972).
98. Order of Approval, Illinois Insurance Director, (June 16, 1976). There is a proceeding
protesting this increase.
99. The 25% requested is on a compounded basis, i.e., 25% of 188%; if granted, it means a
235% increase over the pre-1975 rates.
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The agreed bill process is now dead. It is obvious that when labor
believes it has the votes, it wants no part of any forum in which it
might be compelled to justify the reasonableness of its demands. But
there is a crying need for such a forum of disinterested people whom
neither management nor labor would control. If the legislators them-
selves will not undertake the effort and study required to understand
the problem and bring forth rational solutions, then it should appoint
a commission of others to do so. The issues involved are too impor-
tant to be resolved solely on the basis of the lobbying strength of
management versus labor. It is the public which pays the costs of
workmen's compensation in every product and service it purchases.
The state, cities, school boards and other municipal corporations (the
taxpayers) pay this cost in every product and service which they
purchase. '00
Legislators, in this writer's experience, are frequently proud when
they have "solved" a problem without adding one penny to the gov-
ernmental budget. But the expense of this workmen's compensation
solution shows up in increased prices to all citizens of Illinois, in the
weak competitive position of Illinois industry against competitors from
other states and nations, and in the long run, it has an impact on the
state's own revenue from its income and sales taxes.
A final absurdity involves the state's own employees. The state al-
ready has a disability pension program which was credited against any
award of workmen's compensation for the same disability.' 0 ' In
1975, this credit was repealed; now the state pays both. 10 2 For fire-
men, their pension fund pays sixty-five percent gross wages whenever
they are disabled.' 0 3 If they also have a workmen's compensation
claim, they get two-thirds of wages in addition to the sixty-five per-
cent of wages from the pension fund. They remain at home drawing
130% of what they could make working. Why would anyone want to
return to work?
The legislature simply was not aware of what it passed in 1975.
Many committed themselves in November, 1974 to vote for labor's
workmen's compensation and unemployment insurance bills and
turned deaf ears to any explanation of labor's bills. Some made the
commitment in 1974 expecting there would be an agreed bill anyway,
so the commitment would not be too embarrassing. They were em-
100. Workmen's compensation alone is now seven percent of the bid price in heavy construc-
tion.
101. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 108 , § 14-167 (1973).
102. Id. § 14-129 (1977).
103. Id. §4-110.
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barrassed though because labor, having the committed votes, then
refused to participate in the agreed bill or any other conference.
In the context of legislative battles, the changes made in 1976 and
1977 were a courageous effort about which the majority can be proud.
The lobbying of management and labor was intense. In terms of
impact, however, these 1976 and 1977 changes were minor and
cosmetic only, affecting less than two percent of the cost, and leaving
Illinois still the state with by far the highest benefit levels. The legis-
lature must go beyond the role of mere mediator between the lobby-
ing pressures. For Illinois has a mess on its hands, which can only be
cleaned up if the legislature, or some public commission it creates,
digs in and truly understands the problems. Any such commission
must have public members outside the control of management or
labor.

